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THE SEVENTH EU ENLARGEMENT AND BEYOND:
PRE-ACCESSION POLICY VIS-À-VIS THE WESTERN 
BALKANS REVISITED
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Summary: The accession of Croatia to the European Union is yet an-
other milestone in the history of EU enlargements. After seven en-
largement rounds the membership has increased from the original 
six founding countries to twenty-eight Member States. Many claim, 
quite rightly, that the enlargement policy is the most successful of the 
EU’s foreign policy tools. Even those who bring this bold argument into 
doubt have to agree that, when contrasted with other external poli-
cies, and the European Neighbourhood Policy in particular, the overall 
balance sheet of the enlargement policy is positive. The accession of 
Croatia is symbolic in a number of ways. As argued in this article, it 
closes one big chapter in the history of EU enlargements but, at the 
same time, opens another. Croatia is – most likely – the last country to 
join the EU this decade. After a sometimes painful pre-accession pro-
cess, it has proved to be a ‘success story’ of the stabilisation and asso-
ciation process. As the European Commission claims, it is living proof 
that the raison d’être and mechanics of the policy employed vis-à-vis 
the Western Balkans have their merits. However, a quick look into 
the future proves that the next enlargements will be far more compli-
cated affairs. The current list of candidates and potential candidates 
is a mix of a heavyweight (Turkey) and the Western Balkan countries, 
all struggling to meet the fundamental prerequisites for a democracy 
based on the rule of law. Failure to comply with the Copenhagen crite-
ria, together with a dwindling appetite for further enlargement among 
some Member States, create a rather dangerous mix. This article ar-
gues that following recent enhancements to the pre-accession policy, 
further improvements are necessary to make future expansions of the 
European Union possible. If only from the geo-political perspective, 
this is in the joint interest of the European Union, its Member States 
and the countries of the Western Balkans. 
* Mirna Vlašić Feketija, Advisor to the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia; 
Dr Adam Łazowski, Professor of European Union Law at the Westminster Law School, Uni-
versity of Westminster, London. This article presents strictly the personal opinions of the 
authors.
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1. Introduction
The EU enlargement policy is often considered as the most success-
ful EU external policy.1 Despite all its flaws it has undoubtedly evolved 
into a catalyst of democratisation and comprehensive reforms in Central 
and Eastern Europe.2 With the successful completion of Croatia’s rap-
prochement, the enlargement policy also vindicated the stabilisation and 
association process in the Western Balkans.3 Indeed, Croatia is the first 
of the countries established on the ashes of Yugoslavia to go through a 
full cycle: from the establishment of formal relations with the EU, through 
negotiations of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement4 followed by 
its implementation, through accession negotiations to a successful rati-
fication and entry into force of the Accession Treaty.5 It is now a point of 
reference for the remaining ex-Yugoslav countries that aspire to member-
1 For instance, the European Commission in 2008 stated: ‘Enlargement is one of the EU’s 
most powerful policy tools. It serves the EU’s strategic interests in stability, security, and 
conflict prevention. It has helped to increase prosperity and growth opportunities, to improve 
links with vital transport and energy routes, and to increase the EU’s weight in the world’. 
See further Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, ‘Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2008-2009’ COM (2008) 674 final, 2. 
2 From the vast literature on EU enlargement, see inter alia, A Mayhew, Recreating Europe. 
The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (CUP 1999); A Ott and K 
Inglis (eds), Handbook on European Enlargement. A Commentary on the Enlargement Process 
(TMC Asser Press 2002); M Cremona (ed), The Enlargement of the European Union (OUP 
2003); C Hillion (ed), EU Enlargement. A Legal Approach (Hart Publishing 2004); W Jacoby, 
The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO. Ordering from the Menu in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CUP 2004); N Nugent (ed), European Union Enlargement (Palgrave Macmil-
lan 2004); AL Dimitrova (ed), Driven to Change: The European Union’s Enlargement Viewed 
from the East (Manchester University Press 2004); E Brimmer and S Fröhlich (eds), The 
Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement (Center for Transatlantic Relations 
2005); AF Tatham, Enlargement of the European Union (Wolters Kluwer 2009). 
3 The European Commission claims that: ‘[t]he completion of accession negotiations with 
Croatia, opening the way to membership in mid-2013, vindicates the policy adopted in the 
aftermath of the devastating Balkan conflicts of the 1990s [...] it is [a] fresh evidence for 
the transformational power of the EU’s enlargement policy [...]’. See further: Commission, 
‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012’ (Communication) COM (2011) 666 
final, 2.
4 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part [2005] OJ 
L26/3. 
5 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ire-
land, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Repub-
lic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Ro-
mania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom 
of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of 
the European Union) and the Republic of Croatia concerning the accession of the Republic 
of Croatia to the European Union [2012] OJ L112/10. For an academic appraisal, see A 
Łazowski, EU Do Not Worry, Croatia Is Behind You: A Commentary on the Seventh Accession 
Treaty (2012) 8 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 1.
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ship, as well as for neighbouring Albania. One may, of course, compile a 
list of accession policy failures and drawbacks combined with a catalogue 
of failed deliverables.6 Nevertheless, the overall balance sheet is arguably 
positive. With the accession of Croatia, the pre-accession policy closed 
one of its most important chapters and opened another. Croatia is, most 
likely, the last country to join in this decade. Compared to the other 
countries in the queue, it is the most politically and economically ad-
vanced and, in many ways, is closer to the previous enlargement rounds 
than what the future enlargements will amount to. As acknowledged by 
the European Commission in the most recent progress report, the cur-
rent candidate and potential candidate countries are suffering from rather 
profound challenges of statehood. This requires increased attention, as-
sistance, including an even more tailor-made pre-accession policy.7 As 
much as it has changed after the previous two rounds of enlargement, 
it still needs further enhancements, taking into account the idiosyncra-
sies of the current candidate and potential candidate countries.8 An en-
hanced negotiation strategy, putting Chapters 23 and 24 at the centre of 
gravity, is an important step forward. However, with similar commitment, 
the European Union needs to tackle other aspects of the pre-accession ef-
fort, particularly law approximation, more targeted and streamlined use 
of IPA funding, as well as the very mundane and resource-thirsty transla-
tion of the EU acquis. The bottom line is that the current pre-accession 
policy is a peace-building and peacekeeping endeavour par excellence, as 
well as a state-creation exercise that will take years to accomplish. On 
the one hand, it will take the current candidate and potential candidate 
countries years to meet all the opening, interim and closing benchmarks 
which have now become an inherent part of the accession negotiations. 
On the other hand, the prospect of EU accession is an important catalyst 
that mightily contributes to (relatively) peaceful regional relations and fa-
cilitates peace building in a region that was in flames until the beginning 
of the 21st century. One cannot forget, however, that being a catalyst, 
the pre-accession policy is not a magic wand. Without solid external sup-
port combined with a favourable domestic political climate there is a risk 
that the non-EU Western Balkan countries will drift into malaise. In this 
article, we argue that, as things stood at the end of 2014, the European 
Union was in great need of striking a fine balance between pursuing a 
6 For a critical appraisal, see D Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Condition-
ality. Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Wolters 
Kluwer 2008). 
7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15’ COM (2014) 700 final.
8 As this article went to print, the candidate countries included Turkey, Montenegro, Ser-
bia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, while Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
well as Kosovo had the status of potential candidates. 
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robust and merit-based pre-accession policy and maintaining the mo-
mentum of the process. The stakes are simply too high not to. From the 
geo-political perspective, all this is in the joint interest of the European 
Union, its Member States and the countries of the Western Balkans. The 
appointment of the new European Commission is a good opportunity, 
which, however, may be easily missed. The reduction of the portfolio of 
Commissioner Hahn to the accession negotiations sends a very bad sig-
nal at many levels. It is as bad as the bold statement of the new President 
of the European Commission who openly argued that there would be no 
further enlargement of the EU in the next five years. Although this, in all 
likelihood, is true, it may be perceived by the current candidate and po-
tential candidate countries as a message of the EU’s dwindling passion for 
enlargement.9 Arguably, this is the last thing that the EU’s pre-accession 
policy needs now. In this article, we argue that this is the wrong way 
forward. What is needed instead is a further strengthening of the policy 
currently employed vis-à-vis the Western Balkans.10
The analysis that follows is structured in the following way. The 
point of departure is Croatia’s experience of accession to the European 
Union (section 2). This will form a solid foundation for section 3 devoted 
to a revamped pre-accession policy currently employed vis-à-vis Monte-
negro and Serbia. A set of recommendations for further improvements of 
the enlargement policy is provided in the closing section of this article. 
2. Towards an enhanced pre-accession policy: the Croatian 
experience
2.1 Introduction
The accession negotiations were officially closed on 31 June 2011. 
On that day, all who were deeply involved in this endeavour could sigh 
in relief – the process that had lasted almost a decade was coming to a 
fruitful end and the historic goal of EU membership was on the horizon. 
In the first two decades of its existence as a sovereign country, Croatia 
has gone a long way from the declaration of independence and the war 
trauma, through association with the European Union to membership. 
At that point, the only hurdles on the way to accession were the signature 
and the ratification of the Accession Treaty. The journey indeed marked 
a big leap forward, although one should emphasise that it was not even 
remotely easy to accomplish. It took years to complete and required great 
9 Similar criticism in E Fouéré, ‘The EU’s Enlargement Agenda: Credibility at Stake?’ (31 
October 2014) CEPS Policy Brief, No 324.
10 For more on the current policy, see, inter alia, MA Vachudova, ‘EU Leverage and National 
Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On’ (2014) 52 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 122.
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determination of those involved. It should be added that it was the first 
accession based on enhanced modus operandi redeveloped to counter-
balance the unsatisfactory experience with the sixth enlargement and to 
reflect the somewhat reduced appetite among some EU Member States to 
proceed with further expansions of the club. As far as the latter is con-
cerned, quite inevitably, the absorption capacity discourse came back 
to the fore.11 Against this EU internal background, the tailor-made pre-
accession policy applied to Croatia was developed. It had to be based on 
the previous modus operandi but subject to a number of enhancements 
resulting from Croatia’s legacy as a post-Yugoslav state that, not long be-
fore the start of accession negotiations, had been involved in the Balkan 
War. These three factors, among others, played a crucial role in Croatia’s 
accession to the European Union and they are analysed in turn.12
2.1.1 The sixth enlargement and beyond
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 was, according to 
many, not the finest hour of the EU enlargement policy. Both new en-
trants were not ready for membership and suffered from considerable 
problems with the rule of law affecting a variety of state institutions, 
including the law enforcement authorities.13 This experience uncovered 
a number of weaknesses of the then pre-accession policy, but also the 
naiveté of political circles that believed in the magic transformative power 
that EU membership would have. It also encapsulated a profound weak-
ness in the EU’s law enforcement architecture, whereby the standard 
procedural mechanisms – the infraction proceedings – are of little use in 
the case of rule of law breaches,14 and Article 7 TEU is too fortified with 
the Member States’ involvement to serve any purpose.15 Stuck between 
a rock and a hard place, the EU Members States concluded the acces-
sion negotiations, yet included in the Accession Treaty a membership 
postponement clause.16 This was nothing more than a symbolic gesture, 
11 See further section 2.1.2 below.
12 For an academic appraisal of Croatia’s accession process see, inter alia, T Cerruti, ‘The 
Political Criteria for Accession to the EU in the Experience of Croatia’ (2014) 20 European 
Public Law 771.
13 See, inter alia, Kochenov (n 6).
14 For the European Commission to proceed with infringement proceedings based on Ar-
ticles 258/260 TFEU, the alleged breach has to have a proper anchor in EU law. To put 
it differently, a Member State must be in breach of a particular provision of the Founding 
Treaties or secondary legislation. Furthermore, due to a caveat laid down in Article 51 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is not possible to solely employ the Charter in in-
fringement proceedings. See further A Łazowski, ‘Decoding a Legal Enigma: The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Infringement Proceedings’ (2013) 14 ERA 
Forum 573. 
15 See, inter alia, W Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, EU Enlarge-
ment, and Jörg Haider’ (2010) 16 Columbia Journal of European Law 385.
16 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, 
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as the postponement was available for one year only. With the scale of 
challenges ahead of both acceding countries, it was rather naïve to as-
sume that a single year could trigger such a tectonic change. So, on 
the one hand, a decision was made to let both countries in, as planned 
on 1 January 2007, and, on the other hand, to continue with scrutiny 
of the newcomers’ performance. The European Commission designed a 
Co-operation and Verification Mechanism that was meant to serve as an 
extended arm of the pre-accession policy once membership turned into 
reality.17 Eight years after the sixth enlargement of the European Union, 
this mechanism is still in place, which encapsulates its weaknesses and 
the scale of the unpreparedness of the two countries that celebrated ac-
cession on 1 January 2007. It is enough to take a glimpse of the most 
recent six-monthly CVM reports to prove this point. For instance, in the 
Report on Bulgaria published in January 2014, on top of Government 
changes that had occurred three times in 18 months (raising concerns 
about the lack of leadership in reforms), the European Commission again 
emphasised the necessity for transparency and integrity in promotions in 
the judiciary, the challenges of case allocation, improvement in the pros-
ecution set-up, the implementation of court decisions, as well as ensur-
ing one-spot coordination of the fight against corruption.18 All these were 
also sources of concern in the case of Croatia, so they were incorporated 
into the benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24.19 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the King-
dom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic 
of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Re-
public of Bulgaria and Romania, concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the European Union [2005] OJ L157/11. For a legal appraisal see, inter alia, A 
Łazowski, ‘And Then They Were Twenty-Seven... A Legal Appraisal of the Sixth Accession 
Treaty’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 401. 
17 Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for 
co-operation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the 
areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption [2006] OJ L354/56; Commission 
Decision 2006/929/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation 
and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judi-
cial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime [2006] OJ L354/58. For an 
academic appraisal see, inter alia, M Spernbauer, ‘Benchmarking, Safeguard Clauses and 
Verification Mechanism - What’s in a Name? Recent Developments in Pre-and Post-acces-
sion Conditionality and Compliance with EU Law’ (2007) 3 Croatian Yearbook of European 
Law and Policy 273
18 Commission, Report to the European Parliament and the Council ‘On Progress in Bul-
garia under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism’ (Communication) COM (2014) 36 
final. 
19 See further section 2.2 of this article.
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2.1.2 Absorption capacity of the European Union
The big bang enlargement of the European Union, followed shortly 
by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, reignited a contentious debate 
about the EU’s absorption capacity.20 This is understood by the Europe-
an Commission as the ‘capacity of the Union to maintain the momentum 
of European integration as it enlarges [and it] has three main compo-
nents: institutions, common policies, and budget’.21 Furthermore, as the 
Commission explains, in order to remain a functioning entity, the Union 
needs to ensure that its institutions continue to act effectively, that its 
policies meet their goals, and that its budget is commensurate with its 
objectives and with its financial resources. Arguably, the absorption ca-
pacity includes also the effective application of EU law at the national 
level and special attention should be paid to it, both in the existing and 
future Member States. Political discourse often lacks understanding that 
the EU is not one of many international organisations of an intergovern-
mental character, but a supranational entity underpinned by a specific 
legal order. It is the efficacy of this legal system, coupled with the ca-
pacity to function effectively in the decision-making sphere, that should 
determine the EU’s integration capacity. The latter clearly has its limits.
It should be noted, however, that this discourse is nihil novi as its 
origins can be traced back to the early enlargements of the then Euro-
pean Communities. The problem of indispensable institutional reforms 
(making it possible to enlarge the membership from six to nine states) 
was already raised at the beginning of the 1970s in the context of the 
EEC accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark. Analogous arguments 
were advanced along with the successive enlargements of the European 
Communities/European Union and paradoxically they remain valid to 
this day. Such views resulted from a conviction that the institutional sys-
tem created for the six founding member states is devoid of the capacity 
to function further in enlarged membership.22
20 See further, inter alia, A Łazowski, ‘Treaty of Lisbon and the EU’s Absorption Capacity’ 
(2010) 19 The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 56.
21 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007 Including annexed spe-
cial report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members’ COM (2006) 649 final.
22 For instance, in 1978 the European Commission argued: ‘The institutions and organs of 
the present Community cannot ensure that the progress of integration will continue in an 
enlarged Community: on the contrary, there is a reason to fear that the Community decision 
making procedures will deteriorate. If this happened, it would be difficult or even impossible 
to create a Community based on the rule of law, which is the foundation of the Commu-
nity and the sole means of recognizing in law that to equal rights correspond equal obliga-
tions. The institutions and organs of the enlarged Community must accordingly be decisively 
strengthened’. See Communication sent by the Commission to the Council on 20 April 1978, 
‘General considerations on the problems of enlargement’ COM (78) 120 final, 15.
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In the Copenhagen Conclusions of the European Council, the ca-
pacity to include more countries in the European Union became a for-
mal fourth enlargement criterion.23 With a near doubling of the Member 
States it was inevitable that the absorption capacity discourse would gain 
strength. Whether rightly so or not, it was also used as an argument to 
push constitutional reform and, after the demise of the Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution for Europe, it served as the raison d’être for institu-
tional changes provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon.24 It is striking that 
the first version of the Preamble to the Reform Treaty (later rebranded as 
the Treaty of Lisbon) contained the following statement: ‘Desiring to com-
plete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of 
Nice of adapting the institutions of the European Union to function in an 
enlarged Union’.25 This, of course, was later dropped and replaced with a 
vaguer and less self-incriminating clause.
The debate in question, although potentially very powerful, did not 
stop the European Union from offering membership of the European 
Union to the Western Balkan countries. In 2006, the European Council 
repeated its commitment to enlargement, although it made the decision-
makers more aware that the political aspects of enlargement should not 
prevail over robust scrutiny of the aspiring countries, as admitting states 
that do not meet the Copenhagen criteria may ultimately weaken the 
European Union and undermine its capacity to react effectively to the 
challenges ahead. At the same time, the European Commission, enter-
tained a request of the European Council and presented a Report on the 
Absorption Capacity.26
2.1.3 Geography defines you 
In the early stages of its rapprochement, Croatia turned to its neigh-
bours, also post-communist countries and ex-Soviet republics, to gain 
from their pre-accession experience. The Croatian authorities considered 
and analysed how the process was managed in the countries that were 
similar in size, administrative setting/culture, political system and/or 
national interest. As things moved forward, it became rather clear that it 
23 Conclusions of the European Council at Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Bull EU 6-1993, 
point 13. 
24 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C306/1. For an aca-
demic appraisal see, inter alia, J-C Piris, The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis 
(CUP 2010); P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2010); A 
Biondi, P Eeckhout and S Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP 2012); M Trybus and L 
Rubini (eds), The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2012).
25 Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. Draft Preamble, Brussels 24 July 2007, CIG 4/07.
26 Commission (n 21).
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was all very useful but only to a certain degree. The idiosyncrasies of the 
Croatian path towards the EU were coming to the surface, with conditions 
and starting points different, or to put it differently, tailor-made. At the 
same time, the 2004 and 2007 rounds of accessions sent an important 
signal to Croatia; it was an additional motivation to double the efforts in 
order to catch up, at least partially. As the late Nelson Mandela used to 
say ‘it always seems impossible until it’s done’. So, a good example dem-
onstrating that membership was possible, was – no doubt – a catalyst. A 
brief reminder is fitting that all Central and Eastern European Countries 
had to comply with the Copenhagen criteria27 and were subjected to a 
specifically designed pre-accession policy that had never been applied 
prior to the Western European countries during their rapprochement.28 A 
plethora of specific prerequisites for integration needed to be addressed, 
and required a robust organisational set-up. Furthermore, procedural 
modi operandi for assessing progress had to be laid down in order to move 
through different stages of the pre-accession phase. It was clear from the 
start that, in addition to the state-building exercise, issues such as legal 
approximation, education and information, translation of the EU acquis, 
as well as the coordination of available pre-accession funding, had to be 
addressed. All of these remained equally important, as these countries 
were moving closer to the European Union and eventually joined in 2004 
and 2007. For the pre-accession policy employed vis-à-vis Croatia, this 
was a point of departure. What the European Union also decided to take 
into account were the idiosyncrasies of the Western Balkan region. Par-
ticular attention was paid to the volatile situation in the aftermath of the 
war that removed Yugoslavia from the map of Europe. Indeed, geographic 
and historic circumstances determined that Croatia, along with other 
post-Yugoslav countries (joined by Albania), became part of the Stabilisa-
tion and Accession Process launched in 1999.29 
In legal terms, the main instruments of this policy are the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreements, the conclusion of which is subject to 
conditionality and benchmarking.30 These indispensable tools of the con-
27 See further on the evolution of accession criteria: C Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Crite-
ria and their Progeny’ in Hillion (n 2) 1; KE Smith, ‘The Evolution and Application of EU 
Membership Conditionality’ in Cremona (n 2) 105; M Cremona, ‘Accession to the European 
Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria’ (2001) 25 Polish Yearbook of In-
ternational Law 219; K Inglis, ‘EU Enlargement: Membership Conditions Applied to Future 
and Potential Member States’ in K Inglis and Andrea Ott (eds), The Constitution for Europe 
and an Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity? (Europa Law Publishing 2005).
28 See, inter alia, M Maresceau, ‘Pre-accession’ in Cremona (n 2) 9.
29 See, inter alia, S Blockmans, ‘Consolidating the Enlargement Agenda for South Eastern 
Europe’ in S Blockmans and S Prechal (eds), Reconciling the Deepening and Widening of the 
European Union (TMC Asser Press 2007) 59.
30 See, inter alia, D Phinnemore, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agree-
ments for the Western Balkans?’ (2003)  8 European Foreign Affairs Review 77.
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temporary accession policy were, in the case of the Western Balkan coun-
tries, introduced at the very early stages of rapprochement. Croatia was 
no exception in this respect. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
was signed on 29 October 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 
2005.31 Like other agreements of this family, it was based on two strong 
pillars: the creation of a free trade area and regional cooperation to ensure 
stabilisation in what used to be a war-torn part of Europe. The under-
pinning principle of the stabilisation and association process is that the 
progress achieved is evaluated on each country’s merits. Croatia was the 
first country to experience this from the early days of association all the 
way to accession to the European Union. It should be mentioned that, 
unlike Europe Agreements which governed relations between the EU and 
Central and Eastern European countries, the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreements have been tailored to serve as tools for accession.32 They 
provided a political, economic and institutional framework that contrib-
uted to the accession negotiations, reflecting the general circumstances 
and goals set by both sides.33 At the same time, as part of the prepa-
ration for what became the fifth EU enlargement, the European Union 
developed European Partnerships and Accession Partnerships. Formally 
annexed to the decisions of the Council, they outlined short-term and 
mid-term priorities for the countries aspiring to EU membership. In the 
case of the Western Balkan countries, the legal basis for their adoption 
was Council Regulation 553/2004/EC.34 For Croatia, the European Part-
nership was approved in 2004.35 Following the granting of the candidate 
status, two Accession Partnerships followed (in 200636 and in 2008,37 
respectively). It is submitted that the usefulness of this instrument was 
rather doubtful, and both the European and Accession Partnerships have 
been quietly phased out.
31 For an academic appraisal, see S Rodin, ‘Croatia’ in S Blockmans and A Łazowski (eds), 
The European Union and Its Neighbours. A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisa-
tion, Partnership and Integration (TMC Asser Press 2006) 61. 
32 K Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of their Pre-accession Reorien-
tation (2000) 37 CML Rev 1173.
33 See the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part 
[2005] OJ L26/3.
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of Euro-
pean partnerships in the framework of the stabilisation and association process [2004] OJ 
L86, 1–2.
35 Council Decision 2004/648/EC of 13 September 2004 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the European Partnership with Croatia [2004] OJ L297, 19–28.
36 Council Decision 2006/145/EC of 20 February 2006 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Croatia and repealing Decision 
2004/648/EC [2006] OJ L55, 30–43.
37 Council Decision 2008/119/EC of 12 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Croatia and repealing Decision 
2006/145/EC [2008]  OJ L42, 51–62.
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For Croatia, a slow move from association to membership took a 
slightly different turn from the fifth and sixth enlargements of the Eu-
ropean Union. Even before the accession negotiations started in 2005, 
it had been clear that the rapprochement would be very much ‘coloured’ 
by the stabilisation factor.38 This, in the case of Croatia, translated into 
strong cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia. When Croatia became a candidate for membership, the 
European Council invited the European Commission to prepare the ne-
gotiating framework for Croatia, taking into account the experience of the 
fifth enlargement, urging Croatia to ‘take necessary steps for full coopera-
tion with the ICTY’ in December 2004.39 This was with the view of com-
mencing negotiations on 17 March 2005. In the months that followed the 
decision of the European Council, the cooperation in question was heav-
ily scrutinised. In particular, one high-profile case was an obstacle, that 
is, the indictment of General Ante Gotovina. Not satisfied with the pro-
gress made, the European Council in March 2005 decided to postpone 
the opening of accession negotiations. This was followed by establishing 
a special task force to assess Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. Follow-
ing the ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte’s report demonstrating Croatia’s 
full cooperation, the green light for opening accession talks was eventu-
ally given on 5 October 2005. It should be noted that the other remaining 
open issue – access to government documents – did not stop the opening 
of accession negotiations and was eventually resolved at a later stage.40 
2.2 Lessons learned? Accession negotiations with Croatia 
2.2.1 The basics
A wise old saying says that one should learn from one’s mistakes. 
Hence, as already mentioned, when preparing the negotiating framework 
for Croatia and Turkey, the European Union made an attempt to address 
the weaknesses in the fifth enlargement. The basics were laid down in the 
Conclusions of the European Council in December 2004.41 Even though 
the process was to be based on the same methodology that had been ap-
plied in the previous rounds of enlargement, it would be adjusted and 
tailor-made for the future Member States.42 A brief reminder is fitting that 
38 See, inter alia, S Blockmans, Tough Love. The European Union’s Relations with the West-
ern Balkans (TMC Asser Press 2007).
39 See Council of European Union (2005) Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 
2004, Presidency conclusions, 16238/1/04, REV 1, Conclusion 4, Brussels, 2005.
40 See further section 2.3.2 of this article.
41 Presidency Conclusions, European Council 17 December 2004, Doc No 16238/04.
42 For instance, the European Council took a decision ‘that accession negotiations with 
individual candidate states will be based on a framework for negotiations. Each framework, 
which will be established by the Council on a proposal by the Commission, taking account 
of the experience of the fifth enlargement process and of the evolving acquis, will address [a 
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at the beginning of negotiations Croatia was moving forward shoulder 
to shoulder with Turkey. However, the stalemate with the latter’s rap-
prochement meant that Croatia would proceed at a much faster pace and 
largely on its own. In hindsight, it is clear that these two facts shaped the 
accession process in terms of its dynamics, the level of involvement of the 
relevant actors and, consequentially, the timeframe of the exercise. 
An important milestone was the approval by the European Council, 
together with the decision on opening the negotiations, of the Negotiat-
ing Framework.43 This key policy document outlined the modus operandi 
to be followed: the principles, substance and procedures for accession 
negotiations. The main principle of the negotiations was clear: progress 
would be determined on Croatia’s own merits and the pace would depend 
on Croatia’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership. On 
the one hand, the negotiations were opened, as the benchmarks based 
on political criteria had been successfully met. On the other hand, the 
negotiating framework provided for a procedure if reforms proved to be 
not sustainable. Mainly, in the case of serious and persistent breaches of 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect of human rights or the rule 
of law, the European Union was allowed to suspend the negotiations.44 
The procedural mechanism is worth noting, as it served as a model for 
the negotiating framework with Montenegro,45 as well as with Serbia,46 
and it is likely to be followed in the accession talks with other countries of 
the Western Balkans.47 An initiative to trigger the suspension procedure 
rested with the European Commission and 1/3 of the Member States of 
the European Union. Such a request was supposed to include conditions 
for the resumption of negotiations. In a departure from the standard una-
nimity requirement applicable throughout the accession negotiations, the 
Council was empowered to take a decision by qualified majority. Croatia 
would be given the right to be heard, while the European Parliament 
would merely be informed. This mechanism had no legal basis in either 
of the Founding Treaties and its formal status was rather dubious. It 
number of] elements, according to own merits and specific situations and characteristics of 
each candidate state’. For an appraisal, see, inter alia, Blockmans (n 29) 82-85.
43 European Council Negotiating Framework, adopted on 3 October 2005 in Luxembourg 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/st20004_05_hr_framedoc_en.pdf> ac-
cessed 23 November 2014.
44 Para 2 of the Negotiating Framework.
45 Conference on Accession to the European Union – Montenegro < http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_mn_framedoc_en.pdf> accessed 23 November 2014.
46 Conference on Accession to the European Union – Serbia <http://register.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=AD%201%202014%20INIT> accessed 
23 November 2014.
47 It is based on the general negotiation framework approved by the European Council in 
December 2004. European Council (n 41). However, a further change of rules by the Euro-
pean Council cannot be excluded in the future.
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confirmed that the accession process is a Member States’ driven exercise, 
though the threshold requirements to trigger the procedure as well as to 
approve the suspension decision were constructed in such a way as not 
to allow a single Member State or a non-representative group of Member 
States to suspend the negotiations without sufficient justification. 
The Negotiating Framework also laid down basic requirements for 
the successful completion of membership talks. Quite understandably, it 
was a combination of the Copenhagen criteria and compliance with the 
Stabilisation and Association Process conditionalities. The latter includ-
ed, alongside the already mentioned cooperation with the ICTY, regional 
cooperation as well as the peaceful resolution of border disputes. Inter-
estingly enough, the fulfilment of obligations stemming from the main le-
gal instrument between the two sides, that is, the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreement, was the last on the list.48 In terms of the substance of 
the actual negotiations, the Framework was based on the previous model 
employed vis-à-vis Central and Eastern European countries. Croatia was 
expected to accept the EU acquis in its entirety (including the case law of 
the Court of Justice), while the transitional periods would be limited to 
a minimum, both in terms of duration and number. Requests for transi-
tional periods had to be properly justified and combined ‘with clearly de-
fined stages for the application of the acquis’. The Negotiating Framework 
provided for an important caveat: any agreed transitional arrangements 
could not involve amendments to rules and policies of the Union, or dis-
rupt their functioning, or produce significant distortions of competition.
It should be noted that, as compared with the previous two enlarge-
ment rounds, the acquis was organised into a larger number of chap-
ters. Indeed, Croatia was the first candidate to complete negotiations in 
35 negotiating chapters. Some were reorganised in terms of their sub-
stance, some were merged and, more importantly, additional chapters 
were added. In selected areas, this move facilitated a much more detailed 
approach, allowing both sides to address complex issues or those that 
had possibly previously been undermined. This included a new Chapter 
5 on Public Procurement, as well as Chapters 9, 10 and 12 (respectively, 
Financial Services, Information Society and Media, Food Safety, Veteri-
nary and Phytosanitary Policy). Of highest importance was the splitting of 
the old Chapter 24 (cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs) 
into Chapters 23 and 24 devoted to Judiciary and Fundamental Rights 
(23) and Freedom, Security and Justice (24). Combined with the political 
criteria, they created a platform for the scrutiny of reforms required from 
and pursued by Croatia. 
48 Together with the European Partnership, which was subsequently transformed into a 
series of Accession Partnerships. See further section 2.1.3 of this article.
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2.2.2 Three levels of conditionality
Conditionality is present from the very start of the association and 
continues until the day of accession. As already noted, the Negotiating 
Framework for Croatia made it clear that membership was not fait ac-
compli and membership talks could be suspended in the event of serious 
breaches of the benchmarks set for the opening of negotiations and of 
the fundamental values on which the European Union is founded.49 This 
meant very strict monitoring by a number of actors, including the Euro-
pean Commission, the EU Delegation to Croatia, as well as the Member 
States and other international organisations. 
The most prominent and probably nationally well-known feature of 
conditionality is the system of benchmarking that, in the case of Croatia, 
was introduced almost six months after the accession negotiations had 
commenced. This system was introduced to measure progress in order to 
advance negotiations, as was made clear in the Negotiating Framework. 
The basic idea was fairly simple: the European Commission was empow-
ered to set benchmarks for opening negotiations in a given chapter and 
then for closing it. The opening benchmarks were defined on the basis 
of the screening process; that is, an analytical overview of the compli-
ance of national legislation with the EU acquis. There were 23 opening 
benchmarks in 11 chapters of the EU acquis, which, in general terms, 
focused on the necessary legal or strategic framework that should be in 
place to discuss further alignment. Closing benchmarks accompanied 
the EU common positions that were prepared for each chapter. They were 
formulated by the European Commission, then usually modified by the 
Member States in the Council Enlargement Working Group and eventu-
ally approved by the General Affairs Council. Croatia received as many 
as 104 closing benchmarks in 31 chapters, that is, in almost all the ne-
gotiating chapters. Closing benchmarks were more comprehensive than 
the opening benchmarks; the primary focus was on the implementation 
of Croatian legislation approximating the EU acquis. The aim was to ex-
plore if the levels of implementation were adequate. An additional novelty 
was the requirement to present a track record of performance. In other 
words, Croatia had to prove that the legislation was being implemented 
over a certain period of time, demonstrating concrete results or, at least, 
a positive trend. In each chapter, the process was completed once a final 
report on the fulfilment of obligations was adopted, proving that all clos-
ing benchmarks had been fulfilled and that a specific chapter was ready 
for provisional closure. 
49 This principle was based on the general negotiation framework approved by the Euro-
pean Council in December 2004. European Council (n 41).
15CYELP 10 [2014] 1-37
The number of benchmarks points to the fact that the European 
Commission recognised them as an efficient tool for guiding the process: 
a more thorough assessment of on-going adaptations under each chap-
ter, as well as a stimulus for Croatia to undertake additional efforts to 
fulfil the requirements for EU membership. It was also considered that, 
as a tool, benchmarking could be used to convince the Member States 
that Croatia was on the right track and that a systematic approach was 
being applied in doing so. Therefore, the standards were clear and the 
efficiency of the negotiations increased. In the national context, bench-
marking was initially considered as yet another obstacle and as a factor 
that slowed down the process of accession. Yet, rather soon, it became 
apparent that the benchmarking could be used to demonstrate or as-
sure that the necessary reforms were taking place and their success was 
evident. Towards the end of the accession process, the results demon-
strated as a part of the benchmarking exercise turned into arguments to 
prove that Croatia had done its ‘homework’ before the ratification of the 
Accession Treaty, and therefore no additional monitoring would be neces-
sary after accession. They were meant to prove that Croatia was ready to 
undertake its obligations as a full-fledged Member State of the European 
Union. It should be emphasised that the benchmarking system employed 
vis-à-vis Croatia confirms that the pre-accession policy has become more 
‘tailor-made’ and unique for every aspiring country. 
At least three features of benchmarking merit a closer look at this 
stage of the analysis. To begin with, the European Commission quite 
heavily used sub-benchmarks within the opening and closing bench-
marks. Thus, the actual number of opening benchmarks, but primarily 
closing benchmarks, was much higher than may appear at first sight. 
Under every benchmark or sub-benchmark a number of actions had to 
be undertaken, or documents had to be prepared. Consequently the com-
plexity of the exercise, as well as a tight time framework, had to be ad-
dressed individually for every chapter. Furthermore, the clarity of what 
specific benchmarks actually required was frequently an issue. In many 
cases, additional consultations took place in order to define to the finest 
detail what exactly Croatia had to do in order to meet the requirements 
laid down in the benchmarks. Lastly, verification of compliance with the 
benchmarks was also problematic. The question was who would evaluate 
if a particular benchmark was complied with, and how this evaluation 
would be done. Was it a task of the European Commission or also of the 
Member States? Seemingly, this exercise was partly ‘learning by doing’ 
for both Croatia, on the one side, and the European Commission as well 
as the Member States, on the other. 
Bearing in mind the direction in which the current pre-accession 
policy is going, it is worth taking a closer look at Chapter 23, which, as 
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discussed later in this article, has become a centre of gravity of the ac-
cession negotiations with Montenegro and with Serbia. This is where one 
can see a considerable evolution of the pre-accession modus operandi. 
The (in)famous Chapter 23 is probably the one that the public in Croatia 
heard most about. Paradoxically, this happened only towards the end 
of the accession negotiations. The EU’s strategy during the negotiations 
was to leave this chapter for the later stages of the membership talks. 
Consequently, the screening exercise in Chapter 23 was the last to be 
performed in October 2006. Furthermore, Chapter 23 was the last to be 
opened when the accession negotiations in other areas were either provi-
sionally closed or were at least in full swing. This Chapter was eventually 
opened among the last ones in the negotiations (in June 2010) and due 
to changing circumstances it forced Croatia to present two negotiating 
positions in a period of one year. Not surprisingly, this chapter was the 
one to be closed only when the negotiations came to completion in June 
2011. The main areas falling under the umbrella of the chapter in ques-
tion were the judiciary, the fight against corruption, fundamental rights 
and EU citizens’ rights. In addition, many would argue that the opening 
and closing benchmarks were the most complex and demanding as this 
chapter covers a wide range of issues. It is notable that it has a very lim-
ited, if any, EU acquis.50 It covers largely political criteria and extends to 
issues encompassing best international practices (for example the United 
Nations and Council of Europe). Overall, Croatia had to fulfil 3 opening 
benchmarks and 10 closing benchmarks, with a number of very detailed 
sub-benchmarks that were demanding both in terms of the time required 
for fulfilment and the substance.51 The closing benchmarks caused a lot 
of concerns and criticism from all sides. Firstly, receiving such a high 
number of benchmarks in the final moments of accession negotiations 
was surprising and, rather obviously, caused unease, especially since in 
different formats and at different levels the Croatian officials were high-
50 This, in turn, often calls for closer co-operation between the European Union and the 
Council of Europe. See, inter alia, D Kochenov, ‘An Argument for Closer Cooperation be-
tween the European Union and the Council of Europe in the Field of EU Enlargement Regu-
lation (2006) 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 311.
51 In order for Chapter 23 to be provisionally closed, Croatia had, inter alia: to update its 
Judicial Reform Strategy and Action Plan and ensure effective implementation; to strength-
en the independence, accountability, impartiality and professionalism of the judiciary; to 
improve the efficiency of the judiciary; to improve the handling of domestic war crimes 
cases; to establish a track record of substantial results in the fight against organised crime 
and corruption at all levels, including high level corruption, and in vulnerable sectors such 
as public procurement; to establish a track record of strengthened prevention measures in 
the fight against corruption and conflict of interest; to strengthen the protection of minori-
ties; and to settle outstanding refugee return issues and to improve the protection of human 
rights. Furthermore, Croatia had to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia. See further Council of the European Union, ‘Accession Confer-
ence at Ministerial level closes negotiations with Croatia’ Doc No 12332/11, 30 June 2011.
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lighting that areas under Chapter 23 deserved greater attention and time 
for them to be addressed properly. Secondly, the ‘buzz-word’ of the clos-
ing benchmarks was track-record. On the one hand, it was a reasonable 
and sound idea to request such records as a proof of preparedness for 
membership. On the other hand, due to the timing and pace, it was a 
heavy burden for the Croatian side. The simple truth is that the basic 
prerequisite for a track-record is sufficient time for the tangible results 
of reforms. At that point, that is, when the accession negotiations were 
already in their sixth year, time was very much desired and its lack was 
rather painful. Many efforts were made to demonstrate that positive de-
velopments stemmed even from the implementation of the requirements 
laid down in the opening benchmarks, proving progress in reforms falling 
under Chapter 23. Thirdly, having in mind that the indications were that 
negotiations might be concluded within a year of the opening of Chapter 
23, a functional coalition of Croatian NGOs52 was formed to monitor the 
Government’s performance, pointing out issues that were not addressed 
properly and realising that this was the chance to insist on the imple-
mentation of reforms that might slow down once the negotiations were 
concluded. All these issues had an impact on both the EU and Croatian 
side: the continuation of the conditionality principle by the EU and the 
Croatian referendum on EU membership held in December 2011.
It is also worth noting that the public administration reform was 
not at the focus of attention from the start of negotiations. As part of 
the political criteria, in the initial phases of the accession negotiations, 
there were interventions not only from the EU but from other interested 
international actors. Two issues were highlighted: depolitisation as well 
as necessary amendments to the General Administrative Procedure Act.53 
Since the developments in public administration did not exactly follow 
the recommendations, this issue, too, had to be addressed in the acces-
sion negotiations. Therefore, these matters were clearly reflected in the 
closing benchmarks starting from 2007. Strong emphasis was placed on 
the organisational and administrative capacities to implement Croatian 
legislation approximated with that of the European Union. One specific 
example where the lack of reform was particularly addressed was a clos-
ing benchmark in Chapter 22 (Regional Policy and Coordination of Struc-
tural Instruments). As a prerequisite for closing this chapter, there was 
to be a guarantee that a legal act dealing with the salaries of civil serv-
ants involved in the management of EU funds would be revised with the 
view to avoiding possible corruption. A solution was found in a by-law, 
52 Platfoma 112 <http://gong.hr/en/active-citizens/platform-112/> accessed 30 Novem-
ber 2014.
53 OECD SIGMA Assessment Croatia 2011<http://www.oecd.org/site/sigma/publication-
sdocuments/48970754.pdf> accessed 23 November 2014.
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while amendments to the Act on Salaries in Public Service have not been 
processed until today. In hindsight, the question emerges whether public 
administration reform was covered robustly enough during the accession 
process. As demonstrated below, enhancements to the pre-accession pol-
icy introduced by the European Commission in the last two years prove 
that more attention is being paid to public administration reform both in 
candidate and potential candidate countries.54 
2.2.3 Pre-accession monitoring
Pre-accession monitoring is another aspect of conditionality that is 
worth paying attention to. Following completion of the accession negotia-
tions, the centre of gravity was primarily on commitments that the Euro-
pean Commission considered needed additional attention and had to be 
fulfilled by the day of accession. 
Article 36 of the Act on Conditions of Accession (which is an inherent 
part of the Accession Treaty) served as the legal basis for a tailor-made 
monitoring mechanism allowing the European Union to scrutinise how 
Croatia was complying with the accession commitments. This mecha-
nism allowed the European Commission to keep its finger on the political 
trigger and the Council of the European Union on the ‘gun’ during the 
remainder of the pre-accession phase. The key questions were, howev-
er, how effective this mechanism would be and, if certain deficiencies in 
compliance with the entry conditions persisted, whether the European 
Union could still employ it when Croatia became a Member State. When 
it comes to the latter, the answer can only be an educated guess. On 
the one hand, Article 36 of the Act is fairly silent on that point. Unlike 
Articles 37-39 of the Act, which provide for the three safeguard clauses, 
this provision does not contain any formal timeframe. On the other hand, 
the existence of these safeguard clauses, combined with the standard 
enforcement machinery at the disposal of the European Commission (Ar-
ticles 258 and 260 TFEU), made one wonder why the European Union 
would keep this political monitoring tool par excellence after the acces-
sion. When this article went to print, it was rather clear that this mecha-
nism was designed mainly for the period between the signature of the 
Accession Treaty and its entry into force.
54 Special working groups on public administration reform are established in Albania, Ser-
bia, FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro. For instance, in Montenegro, the special working 
group for public administration was established to help improve the existing framework 
for the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and its focus 
is solely on public administration reform <http://www.mvpei.gov.me/en/news/135349/
Press-release-Special-working-group-for-public-administration-reform.html> accessed 30 
November 2014.
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Not surprisingly, the implementation of the monitoring mechanism 
rested on the shoulders of the European Commission. It had the obliga-
tion to ‘closely monitor all commitments undertaken by Croatia in the 
accession negotiations’. This covered the commitments that needed to be 
complied with before or by the date of accession to the European Union, 
including a set of JHA related commitments laid down in Annex VII to 
the Accession Treaty and obligations in respect of state aid to the ship-
building industry and steel sector (Annexes VIII and IX to the Accession 
Treaty respectively). The tools employed in this exercise included moni-
toring tables as well as the regular dialogue under the SAA, peer assess-
ment missions, the pre-accession economic programme, fiscal notifica-
tions and early warning letters to the Croatian authorities. The European 
Commission also had the obligation to present six-monthly assessments 
up to the accession on commitments undertaken by Croatia. Following 
the signature of the Accession Treaty in December 2011, the Monitor-
ing Report on Croatia’s accession preparations was published in April 
2012.55 It was based on the Enlargement Strategy Paper and a progress 
report of October 2011.56 The intention was to note the progress, but also 
to indicate a number of areas that required improvements. In response 
to the recommendations made by the EU, Croatia prepared an Action 
Plan to address these issues.57 Of crucial importance were the findings 
of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s state of prepared-
ness for EU membership, published in October 2012.58 In the months 
that followed, the European Commission focused in its monitoring, inter 
alia, on Chapter 8 Competition Policy, in particular state aid to shipyards 
that was explicitly covered by the already discussed Article 36 of the Act 
on Conditions of Accession. Not surprisingly, special attention was paid 
to Chapter 23 with the following items remaining on the radars of the 
European Commission: the results of the judicial reform strategy, the re-
cord in fighting corruption and organised crime, conflict of interest, anti-
discrimination and ombudsman legislative acts, and Chapter 24 Justice, 
55 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, ‘Monitoring Report on Croatia’s accession preparations’ COM (2012) 186 final. 
56 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012’ COM (2011) 666 final.
57 The Action Plan for the Fulfillment of the Remaining Obligations of the Accession Ne-
gotiations was adopted at the Government session on 10 May 2012 (adopted during the 
closed part of the Government session, classified as limited); two revised action plans were 
prepared following the European Commission’s Report on the State of Preparedness for 
EU membership in April 2012 and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report in October 2012. 
Reports on the implementation of the revised Action plan are available in Croatian on the 
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs website <http://www.mvep.hr/hr/hrvatska-i-
europska-unija/pregovori/akcijski-planovi/> accessed 23 November 2014.
58 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the ‘Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s state 
of preparedness for EU membership’ COM (2012) 601 final.
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Freedom and Security (outstanding issues on border management with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). In less than a year before accession, there was 
still a list of 10 actions to be addressed and completed before the acces-
sion scheduled in the Accession Treaty for 1 July 2013. This monitoring 
exercise played an important role in the ratification process, when some 
Member States, particularly the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Germany, were closely monitoring developments in Croatia before giving 
a green light to membership which materialised on 1 July 2013.
2.3 The Croatian perspective
2.3.1. Introduction
Having analysed the mechanics of the pre-accession policy that had 
been employed vis-à-vis Croatia, it is fitting to take a domestic perspective 
and delve deeper into a number of challenges this process has brought 
home to the Croatian authorities. In doing this, we argue that although 
the performance was not always flawless the Croatian state apparatus 
made a significant effort without which accession would not have been 
possible. To analyse all internal aspects of rapprochement would exceed 
the limits of this article. Therefore, in the paragraphs that follow, readers 
are presented with a snapshot of several key matters. This includes the 
planning of actions needed to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the coor-
dination of Croatia’s EU policy, the political consensus behind this ex-
ercise, as well as the transparency of the process. This is followed by a 
snapshot of the human side of this story. Arguably, without the commit-
ment of hundreds who were involved in the process, accession would not 
have materialised.
2.3.2 Timing, planning, coordination and transparency
The four factors in the subheading above merit attention for the pur-
poses of this analysis. As was the case during the accession negotia-
tions with the post-communist countries, the countries aspiring for EU 
membership tend to predict the duration and the character of the entire 
process. Understandably, there is huge interest among domestic political 
circles concerning the completion of the accession negotiations and the 
EU membership that follows. In general terms, it is not advisable to make 
ex ante estimates of accession negotiations as to their duration and con-
tent. Optimism may overrule reality on the ground, as all too frequently 
such estimates neither reflect the complexity or character of the negotia-
tions, nor take into account the idiosyncrasies of a particular country’s 
rapprochement. The timeframe is a reflection of at least three factors: 
political and other circumstances in the EU Member States, the abil-
ity of the candidate’s administration to respond to all the requirements 
placed upon it, and the capacity of the European Commission to keep 
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the momentum and to assist in solving open issues in the course of the 
process. For instance, at the time of the Croatian accession negotiations, 
the economic crisis altered the level of interest among Member States and 
this, to an extent, removed enlargement from the priority list. Further-
more, elections to the European Parliament took place in 2009 and, as is 
well known, they were followed by the appointment of the new European 
Commission. Needless to say that from 2007 to 2009 the Member States 
were rather pre-occupied, first with the negotiations of the Treaty of Lis-
bon and, once it was signed, with the very painful road to its ratification. 
Against this more general political background, Croatia proceeded with 
its own preparations for accession.
Starting with the adoption of the Implementation Plan for the Croa-
tian SAA,59 a lot of emphasis was placed on legal approximation and pre-
accession funding. It was soon clear to all that it would be a far more com-
prehensive exercise than initially anticipated, requiring organisational as 
well as administrative adjustments and reforms. The original Action Plan 
developed into an annual National Programme for Accession to the EU, 
which became a strategic governmental document, a central and essen-
tial tool for European integration and an effective instrument for defining 
priorities and the pace of legal approximation.60 It evolved through time 
from listing the SAA priority areas, through addressing the Avis61 and 
European/Accession Partnership priorities, to the benchmarks laid down 
in the accession negotiations and, eventually, the agreed results of the 
negotiations. As one would expect, in the period of accession negotiations 
an enormous number of laws and by-laws for the purpose of approxi-
mation were adopted. A peak of legislative activity was reached in 2008 
when 122 laws and 334 by-laws were adopted. It is notable that since 
2006 all laws and specific by-laws with approximation relevance were 
consulted over with the European Commission before their adoption. 
Another national challenge, closely related to the approximation effort, 
was the translation of the EU acquis into Croatian, as well as the trans-
lation of Croatian legislation into English. The former is of crucial impor-
tance and, until the day of accession, remains largely the responsibility 
of the aspiring country. Neglecting this technical, yet important, exercise 
may have, as demonstrated by the previous enlargement rounds, quite 
59 Ministry for European Integration of the Republic of Croatia (2002) Implementation 
Plan for the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and 
the European Communities and their Member States, Zagreb <http://www.mvep.hr/hr/
hrvatska-i-europska-unija/eu-za-gradane/publikacije/publikacije-u-izdanju-mvep-a/> 
accessed 23 November 2014.
60 See further T Ćapeta, D Mihelin and S Rodin, ‘Croatia’ in A Kellermann and others (eds), 
The Impact of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of New EU Member State and (Pre-) Candi-
date Countries. Hopes and Fears (TMC Asser Press 2006) 69 and particularly 94-109.
61 Communication from the Commission, Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership 
of the European Union, COM (2004) 257 final.
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profound consequences for the effectiveness of EU law in a new Member 
State after accession.62 Bearing this in mind, in the early stages of Croa-
tia’s integration process, a translation service was established for that 
purpose. The translation of EU legislation into Croatian started in 2003 
and already in 2005 it became clear that the negotiation process would 
require additional efforts in translation, which would be very resource 
thirsty. This became even more evident in 2006 when the benchmarking 
system was introduced and procedural agreement was made with the 
European Commission. Pursuant to the latter, consultation had to take 
place on all draft legislation before adoption, meaning that it had to be 
simultaneously prepared in Croatian and English. The same applied to 
all documentation related to the accession negotiations, which included 
screening lists and presentations, negotiating positions, strategies, ac-
tion plans, reports on the implementation of legislation and final reports 
on the fulfilment of obligations for the closing of each chapter. According 
to estimations, Croatia produced tens of thousands of pages in bilingual 
form, which was an immense workload, especially in 2007–2009, which 
was the most vibrant period in this respect.63 This came at a cost of ap-
proximately EUR 12 million, financed by the national budget.
Preparation for accession was a major effort. An endeavour of such 
magnitude and complexity goes beyond the particular interests of selected 
parties or governments. To put it differently, it must be a product of na-
tional consensus so that a number of reforms can be undertaken. In rela-
tion to accession negotiations, this consensus – sometimes considered as 
‘mission impossible’ – was defined and confirmed through Parliamentary 
documents that provided the basis for the successful implementation of 
the process. Good examples were the Declaration on the Fundamental 
Principles of Negotiations on Full Membership of the Republic of Croatia 
in the EU and the Statement of the Croatian Parliament and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia on Joint Actions in the Process of Nego-
tiations on Membership of the EU (January 2005).64
Not only did those two documents encapsulate consensus over the 
Croatian strategic goal of becoming an EU member, they also laid down 
62 M Bobek, ‘The Binding Force of Babel: The Enforcement of EC Law Un-published in the 
Languages of the New Member States’ (2006-07) 9 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 43; K Lasinski-Sulecki and W Morawski, ‘Late Publication of EC Law in Languages 
of New Member States and its Effects: Obligations on Individuals Following the Court’s 
Judgment in Skoma-Lux’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 705. 
63 V Drobnjak, ‘Specificity of Croatia’s Accession Negotiations and Implications for EU 
Membership’ (2011) Études Européennes <www.etudes-europeennes.eu> accessed 23 No-
vember 2014.
64 Croatian Parliament website <http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2490> and 
<http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2476> accessed 23 November 2014.
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the basic principles of the (certain) transparency and openness of the 
process to the wider public. A forum for that purpose was established in 
the Croatian Parliament: the National Committee for Monitoring Acces-
sion Negotiations (hereinafter the National Committee). It was led by the 
leader of the opposition party, co-chaired by a ruling party representa-
tive, with members from all parliamentary parties. To ensure inclusion, 
it also comprised a member from the Office of the President, and repre-
sentatives of trade unions, the business community and academia. The 
purpose of the National Committee was to discuss the open issues of 
negotiations, to have a consultative role in the preparation of relevant 
negotiating acts and to initiate further discussions with other relevant 
stakeholders. The National Committee was probably the easiest place to 
acquire information on the accession negotiations process (without the 
simultaneous dissemination of relevant documentation). 
The transparency of the Government’s work was discussed on many 
occasions, especially in the final phases of the accession negotiations.65 It 
is notable that the EU Negotiating Framework for Croatia did not contain 
any specific requirements for transparency, so, following a recommen-
dation of the European Commission, neither the Government nor the 
National Committee presented any documentation to the public, with the 
intention of not jeopardising the conduct of negotiations. The Croatian 
Government was generally considered unwilling to share too much infor-
mation. To prove this point, it is enough to check the number of points 
on the Government’s agenda that were discussed behind closed doors. 
This pattern applied, too, to dossiers related to the EU accession nego-
tiations. Such modus operandi, in turn, raised strong criticism from the 
public, academia and civil society organisations.66 Part of the trepidation 
to share more information might have been linked to insecurity about 
how the accession process would actually be run in the light of the rules 
of the game being revised by the European Commission. There was an 
internal reason, too. There was a degree of lack of trust in the national 
partners, their knowledge and will to work together for a joint cause. The 
situation has changed over the years. As things stand today, Croatian 
NGOs have managed to build a strong network with their counterparts 
in the region. One of the aims is passing on Croatian experience and as-
sistance in preparing for the accession process. In more general terms, 
the challenges of transparency during the Croatian pre-accession phase 
have had a spillover effect on the levels of transparency of governmental 
65 See, inter alia, I Vidačak and M Škrabalo, ‘Exploring the Effects of Europeanization on 
the Openness of Public Administration in Croatia’ (2014) 14 Croatian and Comparative 
Public Administration 149. 
66 ibid.
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and parliamentary actions in the current candidate and potential candi-
date countries. That, too, has now become an important dossier in EU 
pre-accession policy.67 
2.3.3 People are crucial for success
Once negotiations are in full swing, hundreds of issues are on the 
table in this comprehensive process. In order to meet the deadlines and 
keep the momentum, two aspects are essential – the knowledge of ex-
perts and properly established coordination mechanisms.
To go in depth into the details of the Croatian institutional struc-
ture for the accession negotiations would exceed the limits of this article. 
However, some key factors merit analysis. The institutional structures 
were defined by the Government in decisions on the organisational set-
up and appointment of members of the negotiating team before nego-
tiations commenced.68 Just as with the National Committee discussed 
above, the set-up of the Negotiating Team was the result of consensus 
between the ruling and the strongest opposition parties. Hence, it was 
expected that the EU accession negotiations would have the broadest 
possible political support and remain a priority. The cadre of negotiators 
comprised mainly established professionals and well-respected experts 
in specific fields. Unlike the case of previous enlargements, where the 
majority of experts were from public administration, in the case of Croa-
tia the team was quite diverse. For instance, one of the two Deputy Chief 
Negotiators, Boris Vujčić, was at that time Deputy Governor of the Croa-
tian National Bank, while the other was the State Secretary for Strategy 
and EU Funds (Martina Dalić), later replaced by the State Secretary of 
the Ministry of Economy (Tamara Obradović Mazal) and later the State 
Secretary of the Ministry of Finance responsible for pre-accession funds 
(Ivana Maletić). In general terms, the members of the Negotiating Team, 
as well as the heads of the working groups established for every chapter 
of the EU acquis, included state officials, representatives of academia, 
the Croatian National Bank, the Croatian Chamber of Commerce, Croa-
tian employers’ associations, agencies and the private sector. There were 
13 negotiators whose responsibilities ranged from one to as many as 
four negotiating chapters. Political affiliation was never an issue, even 
if there were a few politically active members of the ruling or opposition 
67 See, inter alia, European Commission Progress Report on Albania, SWD (2014) 304 final, 
6-7, 11.
68 Odluka o imenovanju članova Državnog izaslanstva Republike Hrvatske za pregovore o 
pristupanju Republike Hrvatske Europskoj uniji, članova Pregovaračke skupine za vođenje 
pregovora o pristupanju Republike Hrvatske Europskoj uniji, voditelja Radnih skupina za 
pripremu pregovora po pojedinim poglavljima pregovora - pravne stečevine Europske unije, 
članova Ureda glavnog pregovarača i članova Tajništva Pregovaračke skupine (2005) NN 
49/05 (available only in Croatian).
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parties. This was neither discussed nor misused. The Negotiating Team’s 
various diversities were never an obstacle in its performance. Quite the 
contrary, the cooperation of different experts with varied profiles was 
beneficial, as they could complement each other in knowledge sharing, 
skills and consultations. The members of the working groups were even 
more diverse and included members of non-governmental organisations. 
The total number of members of all working groups varied though the 
process, with 1,868 members in June 2011 when the negotiations were 
concluded. This number should be treated with caution, though, as the 
levels of involvement and duration varied throughout the pre-accession 
phase.69 It has been estimated that there were at least 2,500 experts 
involved in the negotiations with varying frequency, which, considering 
the size of Croatia, is a serious undertaking. However, it is evident today 
that the large number of professionals involved has not ensured continu-
ity in policy making upon the completion of negotiations, but rather, in 
many respects, it was the strong, motivated and persistent individuals 
that were the factor of success. 
It was crucial that there was an appropriate level of understanding 
of the whole process, which would not have been possible without the 
knowledge of those deeply involved in the negotiations, their skills and, 
last but not least, motivation. Motivation lay not so much in financial 
terms, but more in the fact that this was a unique opportunity to par-
ticipate in a process of such scale and transformative potential, and also 
knowing that it might be a sound step forward in an individual career. 
Another crucial point for the process was that the majority of the 
core team that ran the negotiations did not change, except for those who 
were simultaneously appointed to positions that precluded continued in-
volvement in the accession process (such as a judge of the Constitutional 
Court). This was not only the case for the chapter negotiators, but also 
for heads of the working groups. This stability was essential for the conti-
nuity and successful management of the process. Whenever changes did 
occur, it took approximately six months for the substitute to truly take 
over the responsibilities.
The Chief Negotiator was responsible for the direct conduct of acces-
sion negotiations. He represented Croatia at IGC meetings and held the 
status of ambassador, performing his duties in both an Office in the Gov-
ernment in Zagreb and in the Mission of Croatia in Brussels.70 He was in 
many ways considered to be the glue of the process. In the complex web 
69 Some members of the working groups were active only for a certain period of time for 
specific activities and inputs, while others were never included in the working groups per 
se, even though they were involved and provided valuable inputs and assistance (they were 
mostly civil servants working in public administration).
70 The same principle of division of work now applies to the Montenegrin Chief Negotiator. 
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of coordination, the role of Chief Negotiator was important in a number of 
aspects. The first was the network of regular contacts with all members 
of the Negotiating Team. Furthermore, of crucial importance was direct 
contact with the Government and its ministers, the Croatian Parliament 
and the National Committee, as well as the close link forged with the Eu-
ropean Commission and officials in the Member States, their permanent 
representations to the European Union and embassies in Zagreb. Sec-
ondly, equally important was the deep understanding of the substance 
of the process: Government policies and open issues deriving from the 
accession negotiations. The position of the Chief Negotiator in correlation 
with other actors and the substance of the negotiations were crucial to 
set the timeframe of all the activities needed to fulfil expectations, for the 
preparation and timely submission of relevant documentation, and to 
meet internal deadlines and those set by the EU side. 
Coordination of the process at the national level was very complex, 
yet feasible. On one hand, tailor-made rules were defined by the Decision 
of the Government on the procedures and adoption of the negotiating 
positions,71 and on the other, the process fitted into the already exist-
ing rules of procedure of the Government and the Parliament. Consid-
ering that the process was constantly evolving (vide the benchmarking 
introduced during the negotiations) and included various stakeholders, 
ultimately it was beneficial that the rules were neither too strict nor too 
loose. This facilitated necessary pragmatism, combined with efficiency. 
3. Enhanced pre-accession policy
3.1 Introduction
The underlying theme of the contemporary pre-accession policy is 
‘fundamentals first’. As the European Commission declared in its En-
largement Strategy 2013, the contemporary accession process is more 
rigorous and comprehensive.72 This is to reflect the evolution the Euro-
pean Union has gone through, as well as the previous experience with the 
accession of the Central and Eastern European countries. The European 
Commission emphasised that the accession modus operandi is now based 
on strict conditionality and progress to the next phases of rapprochement 
71 Government Decision on the procedure of preparation and adoption of the negotiating 
positions, 15 April 2005 and 20 April 2006; not published; available in Croatian only (Od-
luka Vlade Republike Hrvatske o postupku izrade i usvajanja Pregovaračkih stajališta Re-
publike Hrvatske u pregovorima o pristupanju Republike Hrvatske Europskoj uniji (klasa: 
910-04/00-03/06, urbroj: 5030109-05-30, od 15. travnja 2005. godine i urbroj: 5030109-
06-18, od 20. travnja 2006. godine).
72 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014’ COM (2013) 700 final.
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depends on the performance of the aspiring countries. The broadly de-
fined rule of law is the centre of gravity of the pre-accession policy em-
ployed vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. Although the same principles are 
applied to all candidate and potential candidate countries, one major 
thing is noticeable: there is a great gap between the pre-negotiation stage 
and when the accession talks commence. On the one hand, this is un-
derstandable as countries struggling to meet the benchmarks for opening 
the negotiations should not be moving closer to the European Union. The 
presumption is that if they cannot meet the basic conditions they will not 
be able to comply with the far more demanding pre-accession condition-
ality. On the other hand, the current design of the pre-accession policy 
empowers the European Union with a variety of tools and instruments 
only once the membership talks commence. Hence, before that happens, 
the European Union is short of persuasive and guiding tools that are 
badly needed to maintain the momentum of the enlargement process 
and, at the same time, to make sure the results of reforms are robust and 
sustainable. In the paragraphs that follow, the three pillars of the con-
temporary pre-accession policy are scrutinised (section 3.2) as well as a 
new model for the accession negotiations (section 3.3). 
3.2 Three pillars of the pre-accession policy
In October 2014 the European Commission presented its most re-
cent Enlargement Strategy.73 It follows on from the previous annual stra-
tegic documents, although it also adds some new interesting elements. 
They aim at strengthening the credibility of EU enlargement and enhanc-
ing the transformative power of membership of the European Union. The 
process is based on three key pillars: the rule of law, economic govern-
ance and public administration reform.74 At a very general level, all three 
areas touch on the biggest weaknesses of the Western Balkan countries. 
Widespread corruption and rule of law issues remain a particular worry. 
The on-going economic crisis and the pains of economic transformation, 
combined with a volatile political environment, create a dangerous mix 
and fertile ground for organised crime and related phenomena. Weak 
public administrations are not very helpful either. Hence, the European 
Union is more than ever engaged in a state-creation exercise, but the 
question remains if it has enough instruments and powers to persuade 
the political circles in the Western Balkans to pursue painful reforms. 
The transformative power of EU accession, if it still exists, and the in-
fluence that it might still have, should be used as long as it has thrust. 
73 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘En-
largement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15’ COM (2014) 700 final.
74 ibid. 4ff.
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In the Western Balkans, it is evident that a long pre-accession process 
makes it less appealing, but, at the same time, there is also the realisa-
tion that it is the only perspective for the ex-Yugoslav countries and for 
Albania. In the case of the pre-accession process, whatever happened in 
the past surely defines what will happen in the future. Knowledge of the 
Croatian accession process should be the most valuable and relevant one 
for the region – not only is it the most recent, but it could also be associ-
ated with a similar legal and administrative legacy, shared circumstances 
and similar challenges. 
In the case of Montenegro and Serbia, for whom the accession nego-
tiations have already commenced, the rule of law issues are the reason 
why the European Union decided to pursue a reversed methodology from 
the one previously applied vis-à-vis Croatia. It is notable that Chapters 
23 and 24 have been the first to be opened. In the case of Albania, the 
EC in its Opinion on Albania’s membership application defined 12 key 
priority areas that needed to be addressed (including the rule of law, 
anti-corruption, the fight against organised crime, human rights), which 
were pre-requisites for the granting of candidate status and ultimately for 
accession negotiations to start.75 Thanks to the progress made, that list 
shrank to five priorities, which, nevertheless, require major efforts.76 The 
European Union sponsors the High Level Dialogue allowing the governing 
coalition and the opposition to attempt cooperation in a political environ-
ment that is otherwise heavily polarised. In EU – Macedonia relations, the 
High Level Accession Dialogue has been the only development in the last 
10 years, considering that candidate status was granted in 2005 and rec-
ommendations to open accession negotiations have been made annually 
by the European Commission but have fallen on deaf ears of the Member 
States. Kosovo has been subject to EULEX77 since 2009, which coordi-
nates both structured dialogue on the rule of law and Priština – Belgrade 
dialogue. Finally, one should note Bosnia and Herzegovina which is stuck 
as a potential candidate and, alas, is engaged in very limited structured 
dialogue on justice and other matters. 
3.3 Enhanced pre-accession policy in practice: Montenegro and 
Serbia en route to the European Union
The most relevant evidence of a ‘new approach’ is the current exam-
ple of Montenegro, and most recently Serbia. All eyes are on the rule of 
75 Commission Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European Union, 
COM (2010) 680.
76 Commission Staff Working Document. Albania Progress Report 2013, SWD(2013) 414 
final.
77 EULEX is the mission that supports Kosovo in the rule of law issues. See further <http://
www.eulex-kosovo.eu> accessed 23 November 2014.
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law issues, which have translated into a new sequence of opening of ne-
gotiation chapters, as well as a more extensive and robust use of bench-
marks. Indeed, these benchmarks provide even more detailed guidelines 
and facilitate a systematic approach to achieving results in the pursued 
reforms. As the then Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
Policy, Štefan Fule, said on 18 December 2013, on the occasion of the 
EU–Montenegro Intergovernmental Conference: ‘the opening of chapters 
23 and 24 marks an important step in implementing the “new approach” 
on the rule of law issues, putting them at the heart of the enlargement 
process’.78
Accession negotiations with Montenegro started in June 2012, and 
when this article when to print, 12 chapters had been opened and two 
provisionally closed. The latter were the usual suspects, Chapters 25-26 
(respectively Science and Research; Education and Culture) which have 
hardly any EU acquis, hence there is not much substance to negotiate. 
When it comes to other chapters, it is notable that the screening reports 
have been transformed from rather general documents into more detailed 
instruments of the pre-accession policy. This is particularly the case in 
Chapters 23 and 24, where detailed benchmarks for Montenegro have 
been laid down. This is a very positive development, which, as argued 
later in this article, should be replicated in all other chapters in the case 
of countries where accession negotiations have not yet commenced. The 
first noticeable difference, in comparison to the Croatian negotiations in 
Chapters 23-24, is the high number of opening benchmarks – forty-five 
for Chapter 23 and thirty-eight for Chapter 24. Their degree of detail mer-
its attention. For instance, in Chapter 23 Montenegro has to meet nu-
merous benchmarks and adopt action plans when it comes, inter alia, to 
preventive and repressive action against corruption, the introduction of 
an effective legal remedy for breaches of the ECHR, implementing recom-
mendations of the CPT,79 ensuring the protection of journalists against 
threats and violence, taking concrete steps to secure the implementation 
of anti-discrimination legislation and gender equality, taking effective 
steps to ensure protection of minorities, and ensuring adequate prosecu-
tion of hate crime. Equally comprehensive is a list of recommendations in 
Chapter 24 which ranges from asylum and immigration matters, through 
judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters, to EU criminal law.
Enhanced benchmarking translates into increased effort on the 
Montenegrin side. To begin with, the government of Montenegro had pre-
pared two action plans for Chapters 23 and 24, even before the accession 
78 European Commission Press Release Memo, 18 December 2013 <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1180_en.htm> accessed 24 November 2014.
79 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment.
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negotiations in these chapters were opened. Furthermore, the govern-
ment prepared and adopted in December 2013 the Accession Programme 
of Montenegro 2014–2018.80 Those documents provide a framework for 
managing the process and they were prepared thanks to the mobilisation 
of public administration, good team work and the involvement of all rel-
evant actors. It is notable that considering the size of the county and its 
administration, this comprehensive assignment is a significant burden, 
and so requires a group of well-motivated and skilled personnel. This is 
a conditio sine qua non. 
In January 2014 the European Union also opened accession nego-
tiations with Serbia. This is considered a more prominent achievement in 
comparison to the other countries in the region. Yet, it is also criticised 
for being unfair to the other countries in SEE, which have been in the ac-
cession queue for far longer. Negotiations were opened with the political 
support of relevant actors, following the Priština – Belgrade agreement. 
It is important to note that progress in that regard is written down in 
Chapter 35 as one of the conditions of accession. Furthermore, the Ne-
gotiation Framework puts a lot of emphasis on compliance with the rule 
of law benchmarks, as well as law approximation, followed by the proper 
implementation of the EU acquis in all the negotiating chapters. It is no-
table that in the case of Serbia the screening meetings for Chapters 23 
and 24 had been held even before the accession negotiations began.81 
This, on the one hand, allowed the EU to maintain the momentum, and 
on the other hand gave the Serbian authorities enough time to conduct 
the preparatory work. For instance, the Serbian Government prepared 
relevant action plans and initiated reforms.82 When this article went to 
print, the screening process for all chapters was in full swing with the 
first screening reports being made available to the public. As in the case 
of Montenegro, the first chapters to be opened and the last to be closed 
remain Chapters 23 and 24. 
4. Quo vadis? How to strengthen the pre-accession policy
4.1 Introduction
The analysis of the Croatian experience presented earlier in this ar-
ticle proves that one of the main challenges for the countries aspiring for 
80 Program pristupanja Crne Gore Europskoj uniji (2013) <http://www.gov.me> (only in 
Montenegrin) accessed 23 November 2014.
81 For instance, the explanatory meeting for Chapter 24 took place on 2–4 October 2013. It 
was followed by a bilateral meeting on 11–13 December 2013.
82 The Draft Action Plan of Chapter 23 was prepared in August 2014, and submitted to the 
European Commission in November 2014 <http://www.mpravde.gov.rs/files/Action%20
Plan%20AP23eng.1.9.pdf> accessed 30 November 2014. 
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membership is compliance with the benchmarks set by the European 
Commission. This particularly applies to the contentious Chapters 23 
and 24, but not only those. Arguably, this has been addressed by the 
recent shift in the pre-accession policy, whereby more emphasis is put 
on the reforms necessary to comply with EU conditionality. Changing 
the order in which the chapters of the acquis are opened for negotiations 
allows countries currently negotiating membership to build a solid track 
record. However, the evaluation of the pre-accession situation in Croatia 
also demonstrates the challenges related to law approximation, including 
planning, law drafting, as well as implementation of the approximated 
laws. The latter is particularly resource thirsty, as it requires consider-
able budgetary appropriations and the creation of new institutions or, in 
the best case scenario, considerable strengthening of existing state ap-
paratus. Translation of the voluminous EU acquis is a major challenge, 
too. With relatively small and politicised public administrations in the 
Western Balkans, coordination of EU policy also proves to be a major 
hurdle on the way to accession to the European Union. While the rule-
of-law related issues have gained prominence in the contemporary pre-
accession policy, other mundane aspects of rapprochement do not seem 
to attract as much attention as they arguably deserve. For this to change, 
the EU’s enlargement policy needs to be further strengthened. In the sec-
tions that follow, several options on how to take the pre-accession policy 
forward are presented. The underlying theme is that the European Union 
needs to be more engaged in the region, not only figuratively but in real 
terms. Furthermore, it needs to develop new policy tools and strengthen 
the existing modus operandi to guarantee robust compliance with the 
Copenhagen criteria without, at the same time, losing the momentum. 
Recommendations in this respect are presented below.
4.2 Proposals for the future
Erwan Fouéré, in his most recent CEPS Policy Brief, has made a 
number of recommendations which merit attention.83 For the purposes 
of this analysis we will take some of them as points of departure. Foué-
ré rightly argues that benchmarking should be strengthened in the fu-
ture. The recommendation is to employ more interim benchmarks and to 
adopt road maps in all policy areas. This, Fouéré claims, would allow the 
European Union to better assess performance in the implementation of 
the necessary reforms. Furthermore, strong emphasis should be placed 
on the actual application of national legislation harmonised with the EU 
acquis. Changing a law-book is relatively easy, but making new laws ap-
plicable in practice is a rather different matter.84 
83 Fouéré (n 9).
84 See A Łazowski and S Blockmans, ‘Between Dream and Reality: Challenges to the Legal 
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In one of his recommendations, Fouéré also suggests a revision of the 
language traditionally employed in the European Commission progress 
reports. This is particularly troubling in the case of the candidate and 
potential candidate countries with whom the accession negotiations have 
not been opened yet. Progress reports remain their key policy and guid-
ance documents. Their frequent generic style and bureaucratic jargon 
are fit for purpose when it comes to the politics of the accession process, 
but, at the same time, they make them rather unsuitable as guidance 
documents.85 The trouble is that assessment of the progress achieved by 
each country is performed by the European Commission through these 
annual progress reports traditionally published in the autumn.86 Antici-
pation of what the report will present for each SEE country is always a 
test for the administration in the EU aspirant country, including political 
circles. Traditionally, they are used for the national grading of the suc-
cess of a government to deliver results for advancement in the integration 
process.
The question is how these concerns and recommendations can be 
addressed in the framework of pre-accession modus operandi. The most 
ambitious proposition is to open accession negotiations with the Western 
Balkan countries as soon as they apply for membership. In the short 
term, this would translate into the commencement of membership talks 
with Macedonia and Albania.87 As we have already noted, following sever-
al rounds of EU enlargement, the appetite for future accessions is some-
what reduced, particularly among the biggest Member States to the West 
of the River Elba. Hence, this scenario is rather optimistic. Yet, it could 
bring several efficiencies to the contemporary pre-accession policy, pro-
viding that a number of caveats are issued from the start. First, accession 
negotiations are no guarantee that membership can materialise. Second, 
accession negotiations may be suspended if a candidate under-performs. 
Third, the strict use of opening and interim benchmarks across the board 
guarantees that particular chapters of the EU acquis are opened only 
when the threshold conditions are met. One may argue that some, if 
not all, of these features are already present in the pre-accession policy, 
though the question is whether or not they are applied robustly enough. 
Rapprochement of the Western Balkans’ in P Van Elsuwege and R Petrov (eds), Legislative 
Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European 
Union: Towards a Common Regulatory Space? (Routledge 2014) 108.
85 Fouéré (n 9) 6.
86 Progress reports are prepared based on the inputs submitted by the national admin-
istration, the Commission’s own assessment as well as inputs by other relevant interna-
tional institutions and the EU Member States. Methodologically, they address political and 
economic criteria as well as the ability to take on the obligations of membership for each 
country individually.
87 When this article went to print, neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor Kosovo had applied 
for membership of the European Union.
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From the point of view of the effectiveness of the pre-accession policy 
and its catalytic effect, it is worth emphasising the importance attached, 
in the currently on-going negotiations, to screening reports. As the ex-
perience of Montenegro and Serbia proves, they have become a crucial 
instrument of the pre-accession policy. Screening reports in Chapters 
23-24 set all the necessary benchmarks, and thus provide guidance for 
the required reforms. In other chapters, benchmarks are not so explicit, 
yet guidance can be deduced from the conclusions made by the Europe-
an Commission.  Arguably, there is no reason why detailed benchmarks 
could not be laid down there, too. Phasing out the European and Ac-
cession Partnerships, together with the general character of the annual 
progress reports, translates into a considerable mentoring and guidance 
gap in current relations between the European Union and candidate as 
well as potential candidate countries. This gap could be filled if accession 
talks were opened with all willing Western Balkan countries and if the 
screening process led to the preparation of robust screening reports with 
detailed benchmarks. Such an option would also have additional advan-
tages. To begin with, it would force the aspiring countries to set up or, if 
they already exist, enhance the domestic modi operandi for the coordina-
tion of EU policy. The Croatian experience presented above proves how 
important this is for successful rapprochement. The strict benchmarks 
would then have to include requirements related to the functioning of 
public administration, including the setting-up of necessary structures 
for the implementation of national laws harmonised with the EU acquis. 
The benchmarks should be further linked to funding under the IPA Pro-
gramme and serve as a point of departure at the programming stage. Last 
but not least, the benchmarking should also cover translation of the EU 
acquis into the languages of the aspiring countries. If this option were to 
be followed, the accession negotiations would certainly stretch in time. It 
is no secret that it would take the current candidate and potential can-
didate countries years to comply with all the requirements and build a 
track record that would make them, without a shadow of doubt, ready for 
membership. Alas, the politics of EU enlargement and the dwindling ap-
petite for future accession among EU citizens and political circles make it 
a rather theoretical proposition. 
This takes us to the second option, which is partly based on the 
same premise that further guidance and benchmarking can be provided 
through the screening exercise. It is submitted that the same effects as 
discussed above can be achieved by the separation of the screening ex-
ercise from the accession negotiations proper. To put it differently, the 
European Commission could be politically authorised by the Council to 
conduct screening and set benchmarks in all relevant chapters of the EU 
acquis without a formal decision to start the membership talks. A deci-
sion clearing the way for such an exercise should be easier to swallow for 
34 Mirna Vlašić Feketija, Adam Łazowski: The Seventh EU Enlargement and...
the Member States without, at the same time, opening a politically toxic 
debate about future enlargements. At the same time, it would allow the 
European Commission to proceed with conditionality and benchmark-
ing, thus giving a badly needed thrust to the pre-accession policy. For 
the aspiring countries, the employment of such modus operandi would 
have, at least, a twofold effect. First, it would allow them to test further 
and to improve national coordination procedures, enhance planning of 
approximation, as well as build the necessary track record. Second, by 
bringing the negotiations closer, or at least setting a clear path to mem-
bership talks, it would allow them to maintain the necessary dynamism 
which, as things currently stand, is fading. Needless to say, a process 
based on strict conditionality and benchmarks would partly depoliticise 
the accession process and bring more Commission involvement into what 
is largely a Member States’ driven exercise. This builds into Fouéré’s 
recommendation to strengthen the benchmarking system. In terms of 
instruments of the pre-accession policy, they would comprise existing 
progress reports, serving as an annual appraisal of aspiring countries’ 
performance, as well as detailed screening reports setting opening, in-
terim and closing benchmarks. Some of the latter would require national 
measures, including detailed action plans and implementation strate-
gies, without mentioning that they would have to be reflected in national 
plans for preparation for accession. In the current political climate, it 
would also be necessary for the European Union to continue to facilitate 
the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as to continue with high 
level dialogues with Macedonia and Albania and political assistance pro-
vided in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Similarly to the first option outlined above, this one would also re-
quire bold political decisions for which some Member States may not (yet) 
be quite ready. Therefore, a third alternative, far less politically heavy-
weight should be considered. Without changing the pre-accession modus 
operandi, it is still possible to enhance the existing policy by means of 
additional instruments. The diagnosis made by the European Commis-
sion in its most recent progress report outlines a number of problems 
for which a panacea can be found at least by two means. It is clear that 
benchmarking should become an inherent part of conditionality before 
membership talks commence. This can be achieved either by a very thor-
ough remodelling of the annual progress reports or, as an alternative or 
in addition, by the adoption of mutually agreed law approximation plans. 
Although both would require a great deal of initiative, they are equally 
possible. Calls for the first are not new by any stretch of the imagination. 
As already argued above, their wording is rather generic and full of gen-
eral phrases. To put it differently, they lack a degree of detail that would 
be needed if they were to serve as a guidebook for the aspiring countries. 
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As far as the law approximation plans are concerned, they remain one 
of the options created by the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
which have never been properly explored. For instance, Article 70(3) SAA 
EU–Albania provides that: ‘Approximation will be carried out on the basis 
of a programme to be agreed between the Commission of the European 
Communities and Albania’. Furthermore, Article 70(4) SAA envisages 
that both sides will define the modalities for monitoring the implementa-
tion of the approximation of legislation and law enforcement actions that 
will be taken. Implementation of this provision as well as equivalents in 
other SAAs would bring a plethora of benefits. First, they would serve 
as guidance for the national authorities in the preparation of their na-
tional plans for the preparation for accession. Second, this would allow 
the European Union to set benchmarks in all chapters of the EU acquis 
well before the beginning of accession negotiations, screening included. 
Furthermore, following the SAAs, the Plans would be joint decisions of 
the EU and aspiring countries. This would translate, at least to some 
extent, into joint ownership. Obviously, the ultimate goal of this process 
is membership of the European Union, so candidate and potential candi-
date countries would eventually have to comply with the EU acquis in its 
entirety. This brings considerable asymmetry to the relationship, which, 
alas, cannot be escaped. To put such plans together, the EU would have 
to provide expertise, taking into account the limited capacities of public 
administration in the aspiring countries, as well as the lack of regulatory 
impact assessment and financial resources. It would be crucial to use 
IPA funding and financing provided by other donors to include existing 
and future technical assistance projects, twinning included, in such an 
exercise.
5. Conclusions
The pre-accession policy currently pursued vis-à-vis the Western 
Balkan candidate and potential candidate countries constitutes a fur-
ther shift towards a merit based state-building process along the lines of 
‘more for more’. There is no doubt that the strengthened pre-accession 
policy based on three pillars developed by the European Union is a major 
and important step forward. It demonstrates that the EU has learned 
from the rather painful experience of the previous enlargement rounds, 
particularly the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. It is argued, how-
ever, that in putting the centre of gravity on the political criteria as well as 
on Chapters 23-24 the European Union, and particularly the European 
Commission, should not remove from its radar other issues that are of 
fundamental importance for a successful pre-accession effort. There is no 
doubt that it will take years for the aspiring countries to comply with all 
the opening, interim and closing benchmarks. It ought to be mentioned 
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that since the process is dynamic, it allows the European Union and its 
Member States to develop tailor-made criteria that can evolve to reflect 
the changing legal, political and economic landscape in the countries 
aspiring for membership. At the same time, it remains crucial that condi-
tionality is not used as a political tool to delay the accession of countries 
that perform well and meet the closing benchmarks. If that were to hap-
pen, it would seriously compromise the legitimacy of the pre-accession 
policy and put in doubt the pledge of a European perspective made by 
the European Council in Thessaloniki in 2003.88 As much as more robust 
political conditionality and requirements falling under Chapter 23 should 
be welcomed, there are a number of worrying signs that have been ad-
dressed above. Some are of a purely political nature, and some, however, 
touch upon mundane issues which should not slip the net. As elaborated 
on in section 4 of this article, far more emphasis on law approximation 
and implementation is required. Furthermore, the European Union needs 
to focus more on the institutional capacity of the aspiring countries and 
become even more heavily involved in the training of the judiciary. The 
latter was largely neglected during the 2004 and 2007 rounds of enlarge-
ment and tackled rather gently in the case of Croatia. Benchmarks are 
crucial to monitor the progress made by the applicants and to allow those 
that perform satisfactorily to progress with their rapprochement. To make 
better use of conditionality, it is fitting to establish the benchmarks at 
the very early stages of the accession process, preferably in the screen-
ing reports for all relevant chapters. Hence, as argued in this article, 
benchmarks should be established much earlier or, politics permitting, 
the accession negotiations could start sooner but be stretched in time. 
For the approximation effort, it would also be important to assist, includ-
ing financially, the current candidate and potential candidate countries 
in the translation of the EU acquis. Last, IPA II funding needs to blend 
even further into the pre-accession policy, and priorities need to be out-
lined in the benchmarks.89 
Summing up, the current pre-accession policy needs further 
strengthening. To let it go would be a mistake of immense proportions 
and consequences. For a variety of reasons, not only is support for fur-
ther enlargements required, but it also has to be real and not figurative. 
This, as already argued in the introduction, is in the geopolitical inter-
est of the EU and its Member States. Bearing this in mind, messages 
of support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans should 
88 Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans, Doc No 10369/03 <http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201.pdf> accessed 23 No-
vember 2014.
89 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) [2014] OJ L77, 11.
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regularly appear in the conclusions of both the European Council and 
the Council of the European Union. Keeping up the momentum without 
undermining the merits of the process should become and remain a uni-
versal mantra. The enlargement dividend is simply too great to lose.
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